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Abstract
This paper begins with the concept of central bank independence and focuses its argument around 
one of its major drawbacks – the potential absence of accountability by the monetary authority. 
Then, beyond defining an alternative legal central bank independence index, we analyse the current 
Statutes of thirty-two central banks, and we quantify their legal independence and accountability 
degrees. With that data, we confirm previous studies, showing evidence of a de jure negative 
relationship between central bank independence and democratic accountability, though not as 
strong as it is usually argued. Still, we remain aware that some very independent central banks are 
also very low accountable – the European Central Bank (ECB) is a good example. Finally, we 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a contract à la Walsh between the ECB and a 
European Community organ, and we ask for a more in-depth analysis and understanding of these 
subjects, in order to improve the EMU institutional picture. 
Kurzfassung
Dieses Paper beginnt seine Darstellung mit dem Konzept der Unabhängigkeit von Zentralbanken 
und konzentriert sich auf einen der wesentlichsten Nachteile, nämlich das mögliche Fehlen von 
politischer Verantwortlichkeit. Anschließend werden auf Basis eines alternativen Indexes für die 
rechtliche Unabhängigkeit von Zentralbanken die aktuellen Statuten von 32 Zentralbanken 
analysiert und deren Grad an rechtlicher Unabhängigkeit und politischer Verantwortlichkeit 
quantifiziert. Mit diesen Daten werden frühere Studien bestätigt, die eine de jure negative 
Beziehung zwischen Zentralbankunabhängigkeit und demokratischer Verantwortlichkeit zeigen, 
allerdings nicht ganz so stark wie üblicherweise behauptet. Dennoch bleibt festzuhalten, daß auch 
einige sehr unabhängige Zentralbanken auch besonders wenig politisch verantwortlich sind – die 
Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) ist dafür ein gutes Beispiel. Abschließend werden die Vor- und 
Nachteile eines Vertrages "à la Walsh" zwischen der EZB und der EG diskutiert und wir fordern 
eine tiefere Analyse dieser Themen, um das institutionelle Bild der EWU zu verbessern.
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1 Introduction  
In the last few years, a large number of countries have adopted relatively high levels of 
independence for their central banks (CBs). This institutional separation of responsibilities between 
governments and CBs is not a new concept, but something that the time and the political and 
economic conditions have made to emerge again. Newer are the defence at the academic level and 
the political acceptance, of the idea that freeing the monetary policy responsibility and authority 
from the politicians’ hands, in particular from the executive and legislative branches, it generates 
favourable conditions for price stability – the primary objective in a large number of developed and 
developing countries.  
The defence of central bank independence (CBI) is based on theoretical and empirical foundations. 
In fact, a considerable number of empirical studies have revealed that independence would be 
associated to a favourable evolution of certain economic variables; and it would create the right 
background to reduce the average inflation, without any loss in the real product, what has allowed 
some authors to argue that CBI is a “free lunch”. The theoretical view favouring CBI is found in the 
new macroeconomics approach, where, beyond other aspects, it is important to know how to set up 
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In spite of the large academic work favouring CBI, some authors argue against it. Recently, one of 
the critiques consists in the potential absence of democratic accountability of independent 
institutions – being independent, a central bank can be transformed into a bureaucratic body that 
pursues its own objectives, neglecting other economic policy objectives, as is the case of a low 
unemployment goal. The concretisation of these worries in the context of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) supports the argument that a democratic deficit exists in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). Recently, a wide spectrum of suggestions has emerged to improve the EMU institutional 
structure. Consolidating those suggestions, we find ourselves describing an ECB applied contract à 
la Walsh, whose advantages and disadvantages are discussed in this paper.  
This paper is divided into five sections. After this introduction, in the second part we present the 
theoretical and empirical foundations of CBI. The third part is reserved to discuss and present 
empirical results substantiating the argument that there is a trade-off between independence and 
accountability, though not so strong as it is usually argued. In the fourth section, we talk about a 
contract between the ECB and a Community organ, and we discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of that solution. Finally, in the last section of this paper, we conclude.  
2
2 Independence – Concept and Foundations   
2.1 The Concept  
In recent years, in monetary policy, it decreased the relative concern about the rules versus discretion 
debate and it increased the discussion on how we shall institutionally establish monetary authorities 
and what incentives should be offered to them in order to achieve the price stability objective. This 
shift was accompanied by the revision of the Statutes of a large number of central banks, in order to 
increase the degree of independence from political interference.  
In short, CBI excludes government’s interference, but in particular the concept is subject to three 
interpretations. In the first place, personal independence, related to nomination and dismissal 
processes of the central bank board members. In the second place, financial or economic 
independence, which requires, among other things, the exclusion of central bank financing of the 
excesses of public spending. Finally, political independence, where we analyse the freedom of the 
monetary authority in setting its objectives (objectives independence) and in choosing the 
instruments to achieve those objectives (operational / instruments independence) (Debelle and 
Fischer, 1994).  
The effective degree of autonomy(1) of a central bank does not depend only on what is legally 
established; it also depends on the stronger (or weaker) central bank board members’ personality and 
on the political and social environment. Some authors (e.g., Debelle and Fischer, 1994; Hayo, 1998; 
and Posen, 1993) argued that the relatively high level of independence enjoyed by some central 
banks is a direct effect of anti-inflation social preferences. Nevertheless, it will be comprehensible to 
use the legal texts for evaluating the autonomy degree of a central bank when, for example, this 
institution does not have enough performance record, as in the case of the European Central Bank 
(ECB).  
2.2 Theoretical Foundations   
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primary objective of monetary policy – high inflation or deflation environments anticipated or not by 
the public, cause enormous economic, political and social costs, as some countries' past experiences 
reveal. That objective is presumably not sufficiently safeguarded by elected politicians who focus 
their concerns on the short-term, or by politically dependent central banks. Therefore, the monetary 
policy and the price stability objective are entrusted to autonomous agents that are not subject to 
elections and that show a longer temporal horizon. In general, the selected agents are given only 
instruments (operational) independence in order to achieve the objectives established by the principal 
(society) or by its democratically elected representatives (government or parliament). 
3
From the theoretical standpoint, CBI emerges as a solution to three different, but related problems. 
First, CBI can make the relative dominance of the fiscal authority (and policy) on the monetary 
authority (and policy) more difficult. In the context of Sargent and Wallace (1981), if monetary 
authorities are the dominant players and move first, then fiscal authorities will accommodate in order 
to satisfy the long-run government budget constraint, and inflation will correspond to the monetary 
authorities’ wishes.  
Secondly, an independent central bank protects society from the distortions caused by electoral 
business or partisan cycles. This reason currently rests in the assumption that the long run Phillips 
Curve is vertical at the natural rate of unemployment, thus monetary policy is neutral in the long run. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that in post-war period, OECD countries had pre-electoral 
expansionary policies, and also a post-electoral partisan cycle.  
The first models of political business cycles with opportunistic governments were presented by 
Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976). According to this theory, self-interested office-motivated 
politicians, independently from political parties, use fiscal and monetary policy in order to influence 
the economy: prior to an election expansionary policies are undertaken, reducing unemployment and 
increasing the popularity of the incumbents; following the election victory, they implement 
contractionary policies in order to reduce the inflationary consequences of the pre-election boom. 
With respect to partisan cycles, the first model is due to Hibbs (1977). According to this model, there 
is a difference in the policy choices and outcomes (in inflation, amongst other) of partisan 
governments that act in the interest of the ideological preferences of their political constituencies.  
These theories originally rested on an adaptative expectations augmented Phillips Curve with a less 
favourable trade-off in the long run than in the short run, and on myopic voters and backward-
looking agents, who are systematically fooled. However, even with rational expectations, these 
electoral and partisan cycles remain valid when voters are rational but imperfectly informed about 
certain characteristics of the government or about its implemented policies. This asymmetry of 
information allows incumbents to create economic cycles à la Nordhaus or à la Hibbs.  
In the context of this second reason, CBI isolates monetary policy from these opportunistic and 
partisan influences.  
4
Finally and in third place, CBI is a solution to the dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy. This 
subject is related to the idea that more independent central banks convey larger credibility to an anti-
inflationist policy. The basic idea of the dynamic inconsistency theory consists in the existence of an 
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stimulate the economy, in order to respond to some motivations (Cukierman, 1992), exploiting the 
short-run Phillips Curve: although at the current moment they promise average low inflation rates, 
later on, when the private sector has already incorporated that information in its expectations and 
decisions, policymakers are tempted to abandon the assumed commitments. The result is an 
economy with higher inflation without any real output gains, because it is assumed that the private 
sector knows the model and it anticipates the opportunist behaviour of policymakers, not believing in 
the good initial announcements. This is a problem of credibility. According to this theory, initiated 
by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and developed fundamentally by Barro and Gordon (1983), a policy 
is credible if it does not suffer from dynamic inconsistency, what would happen if the policymakers’ 
behaviour were limited by rules or by other “commitment technology” that influences policymakers’ 
incentives directly(2).  
A solution to the inflationary bias problem focuses on the central bank’s preferences(3). That 
solution, incorporating the delegation of monetary policy authority and responsibility to an 
autonomous agent that acts in agreement with an objective function, which is different from 
society’s (and from elected politicians’), can assume two approaches: a legislative one, where a 
conservative agent is made independent from the government(4); and a contractual approach, where 
the central bank is given operational independence (remaining dependent on government with 
respect to objectives).  
The first of these delegation solutions – the conservatism solution, presented formally by Rogoff 
(1985) – identifies the independence concept with the selection of an agent for central banker with a 
higher relative aversion to inflation than the society’s. As a result, the inflation bias is eliminated, 
although with an inevitable cost – the central bank inability to react to productivity shocks. 
Therefore, the conservative solution implies a trade-off between flexibility and credibility. Lohmann 
(1992) proposed a solution to reduce this trade-off, when she admitted that the government was able 
to override central bank’s decisions, although with some political cost, which in her contribution 
behaves as a proxy for the level of independence enjoyed by the central bank.  
The Rogoff’s solution embodies another difficulty comprised in the inability to find a central banker 
with the right conservative preferences. The contractual approach (or the inflation targets approach), 
developed by Walsh (1995), Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Svensson (1997, 1998), overcomes 
that difficulty because it rests on the assumption that, rather than relying on the possibility of finding 
the conservative central banker, it could be possible to affect directly the incentives faced by the 
central bank. Walsh (op.cit.), in the principal-agent context, suggests an optimal incentive contract 
for central bankers, in which rewards and penalties (monetary or of some other kind, e.g., threats of 
firing) are imposed on an instruments independent central bank, in order to induce the socially 
optimal policy, eliminating the inflationary bias and allowing an optimal response to shocks, even 
with central bank information advantage. Svensson (op.cit.) shows that, with persistence in 
unemployment or in output, a linear inflation contract continues to yield an equilibrium that mimics 
the solution under commitment, provided that it includes a state-contingent component.  
5
Nowadays, the example more similar to the Walsh optimal linear contract is the Policy Targets 
Agreement, achieved between the Treasure and the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
(5).  
2.3 Empirical Foundations   
The view favouring CBI, besides being justified in theoretical models, also bases its foundations on 
Seite 4 von 16 EIoP: Text 2001-009 Full Text
27.07.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-009.htmempirical studies that show favourable correlations between CBI and some economic variables: 
inflation, output growth, disinflation costs (sacrifice ratio), inflation benefits, productivity growth, 
private investment, unemployment, real interest rates, output and inflation trade-off, fiscal deficit and 
high-powered money growth(6).  
Above all, the most frequent result respects to the negative correlation between CBI and average 
inflation, which is found at least in developed countries, although without any unequivocal and 
significant relationship between central bank autonomy and real output. Thus, we could say that CBI 
is a free lunch supplying a credibility bonus. However, in spite of the negative correlation between 
CBI and inflation, it is premature to support such a causality direction between the two variables. It 
is possible that the negative relationship could be due to a third variable: due to a bad inflation 
experience in past, society can, on one hand, support economic policies with price stability as a goal 
and, on the other hand, demand more independent central banks. After all, both CBI and low 
inflation can be two reflexes of society’s inflation adverse preferences.  
3 Central Bank Independence and Accountability   
3.1 Critics Against Central Bank Independence  
In spite of being backed up by empirical and theoretical arguments, CBI is subject to some critics. In 
first place, some of the dynamic inconsistency model assumptions are criticisable, e.g., the 
hypothesis that policymakers systematically continue exploring the private sector expectations 
(McCallum, 1995)(7). Besides that, the academic literature also presents doubts about the suggested 
solutions for the dynamic inconsistency problem. In this respect, for example, McCallum (op. cit.) 
shows its doubts on the effectiveness of the Walsh (1995) contract: being accepted that one of the 
reasons for the dynamic inconsistency problem is the policymakers’ inability to maintain their 
commitment, one must accept that it will be very difficult to sustain the contract between politicians 
policymakers and the central bank.  
In second place, some problems are related to empirical evidence conclusions, particularly, the 
difficulty in measuring the effective degree of independence; the negligence of significant variables 
in the explanation of the inflation; the little robustness in statistical correlations and the absence of 
causality relationships, in spite of being argued by some authors(8).  
6
A third order of criticism is based on the separation between fiscal and monetary authorities that is 
associated with CBI. On one hand, it could imply difficulties in the coordination/cooperation 
between the two authorities, with potential losses in the achievement of their objectives. On the other 
hand, it arises the worry that an independent central bank will be free to do what it wants to do, 
whatever its effects on the society’s welfare – this is the central bank accountability (CBA) theme(9). 
This assumes importance in times of large economic shocks and especially when the government’s 
(and society’s) objectives do not correspond to the independent central bank’s(10).  
It is true that in the absence of monetary policy effects on employment and output, it will be more 
difficult to talk about the necessary accountability of central banks. In this respect, e.g., Cukierman 
says that “existing evidence shows that, although such [real] effects are temporary, they are 
nevertheless present and sometimes non negligible. Hence, monetary policy can also be gainfully 
used to stabilise real shocks to employment and output.”(11). Therefore, it seems useful to continue 
talking about independence and accountability. 
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In the dictionary, ‘accountability’ is the quality or the state of being ‘accountable’. Someone is 
accountable when is responsible for his own decisions or actions and is expected to explain them 
when asked.  
The accountability and independence concepts are closely related with the democracy concept. In a 
representative democracy, the parliament (and the government) are chosen by the public, who holds 
them accountable, at least through the election process.  
Accepting that central banks are those entities that may conduct monetary policy, and recognizing 
the politicians’ natural tendency to use in excess the monetary instruments to achieve their own 
objectives, society delegates the monetary policy responsibility to an independent central bank. The 
democratic legitimacy of this central bank requires that it should be accountable to society, or at least 
to society’s elected representatives, by the effects that its behaviour has on the society’s welfare and 
on the achievement of the objectives fixed in the Statutes of the central bank(12).  
7
This legitimacy mechanism is a very difficult task, mainly in those cases in which the central bank’s 
Statutes widely protect it from any government interference and when the monetary authority enjoys 
both objectives and instruments independence. In the context of this discussion, Amtenbrink (1999) 
reminds us that some authors accept this lower accountability implied by a higher CBI – they argue 
that if the safeguarding of a democratic system requires monetary and price stability and if this 
background is favoured by CBI, then we should accept the lower CBA degree as a price to pay for a 
stable democratic regime.  
The legal conflict between CBI and CBA was empirically demonstrated in three previous studies(13)
and it is partially confirmed in this article with a larger sample of central banks.  
3.3 Empirical Evidence   
3.3.1 Previous work  
Until now there is a small number of empirical studies on CBA. One problem that emerges in this 
context is to find an accurate CBA index, as it happens with CBI. The first contribution to the 
construction of an accountability index belongs to Havrilesky (1995). But because the Havrilesky 
index widely overlapped with CBI indexes, Briault, et al. (1996) suggested another index based on 
four criteria: “whether the central bank is subject to external monitoring by parliament; whether the 
minutes of meetings to decide monetary policy are published; whether the central bank publishes an 
inflation or monetary report of some kind, in addition to standard central bank bulletins; and whether 
there is a clause that allows the central bank to be overridden in the event of certain shocks”. Using 
this index to evaluate 14 central banks(14), Briault, et al. (op. cit.) found an inverse relationship, 
statistically significant, between CBA and central bank goal independence. Also in their article, 
countries recognized by good reputation in the fight against inflation seemed to be characterized by 
low accountability levels, happening the opposite in the cases of less respectable reputation 
countries. This evidence would be in agreement with the idea that accountability (mainly 
transparency) would also have served as a partial substitute for central bank reputation (and 
independence), when monetary regimes had not been completely established. Nolan and Schaling 
(1996), using the Briault, et al.’s accountability index, found as well a negative correlation between 
CBI and CBA.  
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more detailed quantification of the CBA concept(16) and the analysis of the laws in vigour in 1997 
with respect to a sample of 16 central banks(17). Making simple regressions of CBI data on 
accountability aspects, they concluded that there seemed to exist a positive relationship between CBI 
and the ‘objectives’ accountability aspect (although this relationship is very weak), and negative 
relationships between the CBI and the other two accountability aspects – ‘transparency’ and ‘final 
responsibility for monetary policy’ (the latter being the more significant). Finally, they also present 
evidence for a negative (and weak) correlation between CBI and CBA.  
8
3.1.2 Additional empirical contribution   
The literature has been using the CBI and CBA evaluations based on the legal Statutes and Law Acts 
that have recently been subject to changes, particularly those concerning some European central 
banks. In this paper we make a new central bank evaluation taking into consideration the current and 
updated Statutes of thirty-two central banks (ECB included). And, besides using the De Haan, et al. 
(1998)’s CBA index, we build an alternative and very simple legal independence index, following 
the autonomy aspects underlined by the European Monetary Institute (IME), in its Report of 
Convergence (November of 1996), not neglecting, however, the vast previous and valuable 
contributions(18).  
In the alternative CBI index, we divide the independence into three classes, in compliance with the 
description presented in the section 2.1. of this paper. In the quantification of each of these classes 
we consider some criteria, to which we can get different answers, and which are subject to different 
quantifications. Finally, for each central bank, we sum all the partial quantifications to obtain the 
legal independence degree (19).  
As in De Haan, et al. (1998), we regress independence on accountability and on the various aspects 
of accountability (although it is not our objective to consider the second variable as explanatory of 
the first). We obtain the following results:  
Table 1  
In the next figures, we plot CBI against CBA and “final responsibility” CBA aspect.  
Figure 1 | Figure 2 
With a higher sample than De Haan, et al. (1998)’s, we find similar evidence: negative relationships 
between CBI and two CBA aspects; but the only that is statistically significant is the one that refers 
to “Final Responsibility for Monetary Policy” CBA aspect(20). CBI and CBA are negatively 
correlated, but this relationship is very weak with our sample. It seems that, although it exists, the 
presumable de jure trade-off between CBI and CBA is not as strong as some authors argue. It could 
be that the ancient severe trade-off between CBI and CBA has not survived to the last modifications 
of some central banks’ Statutes, whose updated versions were analysed in this paper.  
4 Accountability Through Contracts: The ECB Case   
In spite of not having found a significant negative relationship between CBI and CBA in our 
augmented sample, we cannot forget that some central banks enjoy both relatively low de jure 
accountability and high legal independence degrees – the ECB is a very good example of that case. 
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4.1 A Low Legally Accountable European Central Bank   
The institutional structure of the EMU has been criticised for showing an alleged democratic deficit, 
which is partially justified by the low degree of legal accountability of the ECB when compared with 
its high level of independence(21). Applying the De Haan, et al. (1998)’s CBA index, we observe 
that the ECB is less accountable in what concerns to the ‘final responsibility for monetary policy’ 
aspect, and more accountable in the case of the ‘ultimate objectives’, where we only observe the 
absence of a legally established quantified objective for monetary policy(22).  
In a democracy, the public elects a parliament and a government. Accepting that monetary policy is 
best managed by an independent agency, the parliament (and the government) appoints a group of 
experts to decide and implement monetary policy, granting operational independence to achieve 
some established objectives. As the monetary policy effects on society are not negligible, a central 
bank should answer before someone, by the achievement of some well-specified tasks. Besides that, 
the organ before which the monetary authority must be accountable needs to have instruments to 
sanction a poor performance.  
In the case of the ECB, this institution must be accountable to the European citizens. In spite of not 
being possible to be directly accountable, it should answer before the society’s elected 
representatives. In the EMU, the more suitable Community organ is the European Parliament (EP), 
although the last European elections have witnessed a low interest by the voters. Besides the EP, the 
European Community (EC) Treaty establishes also that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can 
exert control and jurisdiction on the ECB(23).  
In practice, this monitoring role is not so easy to conduct. In first place, the EC Treaty and the 
Statutes of the ESCB and ECB do not provide for sufficient instruments to hold the ECB accountable
– it lacks, especially, a clear yardstick for evaluate its performance in the achievement of the 
objectives. Indeed, without a clear Treaty-based definition of price stability it is hard for outsiders to 
demonstrate that the ECB is at fault. Therefore, it remains also complex to think on penalisation for 
poor performance(24).  
10
In second place, the EP cannot make amendments in the institutional structure governing the ECB. 
This is a unique position that the ECB enjoys even among the most independent central banks, as 
any change in the Statutes of the ECB and ESCB requires a change in the EC Treaty, which for itself 
requires that all Member States agree with that legal modification. Furthermore, the ECB has the 
right to be consulted in the case of modification of its Statutes(25).  
In spite of the bad legal picture painted in the last paragraphs, until now the ECB has made some 
effort to present more information than is legally required, increasing the transparency of monetary 
policy, with the exception of the minutes of the Governing Council meetings, fact that has originated 
some discussions(26). Moreover, the ECB has strengthened its relationship with the EP, by attending 
hearings organised by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the EP. Also, we could 
always remember that in the beginning it was the national parliaments who dictated the rules of the 
game, through ratification. Therefore, the ECB did not impose its high independence and low 
accountability on the European society; instead, it was accepted and decided by the national 
parliaments.  
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The creation of the ECB recalled the discussion on CBI and CBA. In particular, it has been emerging 
critics against the high independence and the low democratic accountability of the newer European 
monetary authority. At the same time, the literature has been advancing some partial solutions to 
improve the picture(27).  
Borrowing from the literature of contracts with central bankers, we could combine those partial 
solutions into a contractual one, in order to, as much as possible, increase the accountability without 
reducing the independence. This solution would imply a change in the institutional structure of EMU 
and would consist, basically, of an incentive contract à la Walsh (similar to the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand contract) between the ECB and a Community organ that could incorporate the Ecofin 
Council and a proportionally representative group of EP parliamentarians. By this contract, the ECB 
would be granted with instruments (operational) independence to pursue an objective (conditioned or 
not in the achievement of other objective; e.g., a target range for inflation, but conditioned to certain 
maximum level of unemployment or minimum output increase in the Euro zone). These binding 
quantified objectives would be the outcome of a bargaining process found at the heart of the 
Community organ, where both the Ecofin and the EP would have equal weights in voting the 
objectives, and where the ECB would also participate.  
11
Under this framework, the ECB would have to answer before the Community organ by the 
achievement of those objectives. In the case of poor performance, i.e., not achieving the goals under 
certain conditions(28), the sanction would consist in the dismissal of all the Executive Board of the 
ECB and in fines for all national central banks that have seat at the Governing Council(29).  
With this institutional solution, the EP would increase its power and participation in monetary policy 
decisions, that affect all the European citizens whose preferences are represented by the European 
parliamentarians. Therefore, we would achieve a more democratic legitimacy in the EMU forum and 
a more accountable ECB.  
This solution, however, has some drawbacks. First, like other types of contracts, it is necessary to 
preview every state of nature (e.g., the extreme circumstances invoked for applying and for not 
applying the sanctions).  
Second, in the setting of the objectives, what bargaining mechanism should exist? And how should 
votes be shared between countries?(30) Moreover, the contract parameters are not constant over 
time, requiring a revision on a period-by-period basis, which would be very difficult, as it would 
involve a renegotiation between a group of several countries and corresponding different preferences 
over macroeconomic aggregates, as they differ with respect to the shocks hitting their economies and 
in the ways they are transmitted. Because of this, the bargaining process could be subject to 
politicisation. Dixit (1998) distinguishes between ex ante and ex post types of politicisation. While 
the former is a problem of coordination and refers to the difficulty of achieving cooperation between 
the member countries, the latter is a problem of lack of commitment and relates to the behaviour of 
each country after being hit by a shock. Assuming that the commitment of each country is assured, 
Dixit (op. cit.) concludes that a lack of coordination between the member countries is not itself a 
cause of too much inflation if each government, before shocks occur, commits to a contingent 
schedule that describes how he will influence the central bank’s decisions, in case of being hit by 
shocks. Dixit and Jensen (2000) show the same conclusion and argue that even the institutional 
setting aiming to partially mitigate such politicisation can be counterproductive.  
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country remains free to renegotiate the contract established between the ECB and the member 
countries, Dixit (2000) characterizes the feasible optimal flexible monetary rule, consistent with the 
commitment regime (no renegotiation of the contract) by all countries. According to that rule, the 
inflation allowed by the ECB (established under the influence of the countries’ incentives) is a 
function of the realised shocks(31).  
12
The third drawback of the institutional suggestion is whether it is fair to punish all the members of 
the Governing Council equally. After all, they do not share a uniform practical incumbency. In this 
case, we can ask whether it is preferable to have a collective accountability or an individual one(32). 
Finally and as concerns sanctions on ECB, are the dismissal rule and the monetary fines hard 
enough? Perhaps yes, especially if the dismissal is associated to a loss of public image and 
credibility, which is very valuable for future official functions(33).  
An in-depth analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of such an institutional structure will be 
valuable for improving the current design of the ESCB, ECB, and EMU.  
5 Conclusion   
Recent years have witnessed a modification in the institutional relationship between central banks 
and government (and parliament), especially because of the increase of central bank independence. 
Behind this institutional change we find social and political acceptance, beyond a wide academic 
support. However, some authors argue against it, underlining theoretical and empirical doubts, but 
also pointing out that central bank autonomy collides with its accountability – since its activity 
affects society’s welfare, that institution should answer by its behaviour. If the agent (central bank) is 
granted an overall independence (both of objectives and instruments), it is probable that the agent 
will neglect the principal’s (society’s) preferences, only acting in order to achieve price stability. 
Recently, academic literature has shown empirical evidence for a negative correlation between legal 
independence and legal democratic accountability.  
In this paper, beyond having defined an alternative and simple central bank legal independence 
index, we expand the sample used by previous studies, to include thirty-two central banks, whose 
current and, in some cases updated statutes are analysed, in order to quantify their legal 
independence and accountability degrees. With that data, we confirmed the conclusions of previous 
studies, showing that in central banking, greater legal independence is related to a small degree of 
legal accountability, especially its ‘final responsibility for monetary policy’ aspect. However, we 
state that the trade-off between independence and accountability is not so strong as some authors 
have been arguing.  
In the last part of this paper, we concentrated our attention on the case of the ECB, whose relatively 
low accountability and high independence constitutes an exception to the empirically evidenced 
absence of a significant relationship shown with our sample. Arranging methodically some 
suggestions that were presented by the literature to improve the picture, we assess the advantages 
and disadvantages of an incentive contract à la Walsh between the ECB and a Community organ 
(constituted by the Ecofin Council and by a proportional representative group of EP 
parliamentarians), which would imply an institutional change in the EMU.  
An in-depth analysis of those advantages and disadvantages, as well as a general discussion centred 
on the contractual approach, will be valuable for improving the current design of the ESCB, ECB 
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Appendix 1 : 
Legal Independence and Accountability Indexes – 
Methodology  
Appendix 1.A – Alternative Legal independence Index – Criteria and Methodology  
In this paper we evaluate thirty-two central banks, in agreement with the following criteria that we 
suggest. For each central bank, we obtain the CBI degree by summing the points related to all 
aspects.  
Table 2 
In spite of arguing that legal independence shall be defined by the evaluation of the nine aspects, in 
our evaluation we exclude two of them. We exclude the fourth aspect to avoid that CBI and CBA 
measures could overlap with respect to “ultimate responsibility for monetary policy”, which would 
artificially increase the CBI/CBA negative relationship; we also leave out the ninth aspect, because 
we do not have enough information concerning this issue for all the analysed central banks.  
Appendix 1.B – Democratic Accountability Index – Criteria and Methodology  
We also evaluate the thirty-two central banks applying the De Haan, et al. (1998)’s CBA index. For 
each of the following criteria there are two possible answers: yes or no, to which corresponds, 
respectively, one or zero points, that are then summed to obtain the CBA degree.  
A. Ultimate objectives of monetary policy:  
1. Does the central bank law stipulate the objectives of monetary policy? 
2. Is there a clear prioritisation of objectives? 
3. Are the objectives clearly defined? 
4. Are the objectives quantified (in the law or based on document based on the law)? 
B. Transparency:  
5. Must the central bank publish an inflation or monetary policy report of some kind, in addition to 
standard central bank bulletins/report? 
6. Are minutes of meetings of the governing board of the central bank made public within a 
reasonable time? 
7. Must the central bank explain publicly to which extent it has been able to reach its objectives? 
C. Final responsibility for monetary policy:  
8. Is the central bank subject to monitoring by Parliament?  
9. Has the government (or Parliament) the right to give instructions? 
10. Is there some kind of review in the procedure to apply the override mechanism? 
11. Has the central bank possibility for an appeal in case of an instruction?  
12. Can the central bank law be changed by a simple majority in Parliament? 
13. Is past performance a ground for dismissal of a central bank governor? 
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Endnotes  
(*) My gratitude to two referees for making suggestions that improved the paper. I also must 
gratefully acknowledge all the comments made by Prof. Victor Constâncio (ISEG – UTL Lisbon / 
Portugal Central Bank Governor) to my Master dissertation, in which this paper is based. All 
remaining mistakes are of the sole responsibility of the author. 
(1) We use the words ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’ interchangeably.  
(2) Recently, Albanesi, et al. (2001), analysing two monetary models, find that there is not always an 
inflation bias. However, they do not conclude that lack of commitment in monetary policy cannot 
account for the bad inflation outcomes of some countries in the past. 
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27.07.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-009.htm(3) The first solution would be the elimination of the distortion factors that originally create bad 
policymakers incentives.  
(4) The chosen conservative agent enjoys instruments and objectives independence.  
(5) The current Policy Targets Agreement, signed in December 1999, sets the specific targets for 
achieving and maintaining price stability.  
(6) For a survey about empirical evidence results, see, e.g., Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) and 
Berger, et al. (2000).  
(7) See also, e.g., Blinder (1999), Neumann (1995), and Goodhart and Huang (1995).  
(8) Despite the critics against empirical studies supporting CBI, Berger, et al. (2000), remain arguing 
that countries with more independent central banks have known smaller inflation rates.  
(9) “There is a risk that, in order to demonstrate independence, a central bank seeks to enhance its 
own reputation by breaking records for price stability, hence steering towards deflation.” (Randzio-
Plath, 2000, p. 4)  
(10) Still, one should note that being the central bank Statutes a decision result of the society elected 
bodies, there exists always an ultimate mean of accountability.  
(11) Cukierman (2000, pp. 2 and 3).  
(12) “Because monetary policy actions have profound effects on the lives of ordinary people, a 
central bank in a democracy owes these folks an explanation of what it is doing, why, and what it 
expects to accomplish. As I often said while I was on the Fed, it’s their economy, not 
ours.” (Blinder, 1999, p. 54).  
(13) Briault, et al. (1996); Nolan and Schaling (1996) and De Haan, et al. (1998).  
(14) Central Banks of: United Kingdom, New Zealand, USA, Canada, Spain, Sweden, Australia, 
France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany.  
(15) Bini Smaghi (1998) suggested a CBA indicator based on a set of 15 criteria. With it he 
compared four central banks: USA Fed, Bank of Japan, Bank of England and ECB. See also Sterne 
(2000)’s CBA index suggestion on a report chapter prepared for the 1999 Central Bank Governors’ 
Symposium held at the Bank of England. Note also that some other authors considered CBA 
included in CBI indexes (see, e.g., Lybek, 1999; and Masson, et. al., 1997).  
(16) See the description of this CBA index in Appendix 1.B of this paper.  
(17) European Central Bank and central banks of: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
and USA.  
(18) Although we can argue that legal independence is different from effective independence, in this 
work we only have considered legal independence because one of the evaluated central banks is the 
ECB, whose performance record is not sufficient to apply CBI non-legal indexes, which are based on 
several de facto aspects, e.g., questionnaires results; the effective central bankers’ rotation; verified 
duration of the mandate of the central banker; and central bank political vulnerabilities. For details 
about these non-legal CBI indexes, see Cukierman, et al. (1992) and Cukierman (1992, pp. 387-389). 
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27.07.01 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-009.htm(19) See appendix 1.A, about the methodology used in the construction of the alternative legal 
independence index. Also, see appendix 2 (Tables 3 and 4), where we show the thirty-two central 
banks evaluation result.  
(20) Our results are only partially in agreement with De Haan, et al. (2000), when they argue that the 
trade-off between CBI and CBA is only correct as far as decisions about the ultimate goal(s) of and 
final responsibility for monetary policy are concerned.  
(21) Although being justified by the low democratic accountability of the ECB (and of the European 
System of Central Banks, ESCB), the assumed democratic deficit is a concept more comprehensive, 
invoked especially in the argument that the European Union suffers from a lack of democracy, 
because the Community institutional structure is dominated by the Council and by an institution that 
lacks democratic legitimacy – the Commission – even though its members are appointed by the 
Member States and collectively accountable to the European Parliament. In the case of the ECB, the 
widely perceived disequilibria between high independence and low accountability could undermine 
the credibility of the European economic institutions when adverse economic circumstances arise.  
(22) Cf. Appendix 2, Table 4, in this paper.  
(23) The ECJ shall review the legality of the ECB’s acts (cf. Art. 230, 232, 233 and 234, EC Treaty). 
(24) The Reserve Bank of New Zealand is a good example of a clear prescription of objectives.  
(25) Cf. Art. 48 (ex Art. N) Treaty on European Union – TEU.  
(26) Remember, e.g., the discussion between Buiter (1999) and Issing (1999) on ECB’s 
transparency.  
(27) After all, “Accountability can thus be seen as a complement, if not a necessary requirement, for 
independence.” (Bini Smaghi, 1998, p. 4).  
(28) Note that it should be clearly established under what circumstances the dismissal mechanism 
would be applied, as well the exceptional circumstances invoked for not applying the sanction 
measure.  
(29) The monetary fines should be sufficiently high for being credible.  
(30) See, e.g., Cassela (2000); Brueckner (1997) and De Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy (1999).  
(31) And trying “to adhere to a totally rigid full commitment rule would risk a collapse of the whole 
system into a discretionary regime with even higher inflation” (Dixit, 2000, p. 763).  
(32) See, e.g., Sibert (1999).  
(33) “The central bank governor may be rewarded with kudos and reappointment for success and 
punished with scorn and dismissal for failure” (Blinder, 1999, p. 74).  
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Simple regressions between CBI and CBA aspects 
Table 2 
Accountability Aspects Constant Accountability R2 (adj.)
Objectives 3.638 [9.943] 0.306 [1.670] 0.05
Transparency 4.569 [12.934] -0.309 [-1.303] 0.02
Final responsibility 5.501 [15.199] -0.525 [-4.0279] 0.33
Accountability 5.064 [9.280] -0.160 [-1.726] 0.06
CRITERIA Points
Personal Independence
1. Appointment of the central bank board members 
a) All the appointments to the central bank board are made independently of the 
government.
1.00 
b) More than half of the appointments to the central board are made independently of the 
government.
0.66 
c) Less than half of the appointments to the central board are made independently of the 
government.
0.33 
d) Government has influence in all the appointments to the central bank board. 0.00 
2. Mandate duration of more than half of the central bank board members. 
a) Equal or more than eight years 1.00 
b) Between six and eight years.  0.75 
c) Five years. 0.50 
d) Four years.  0.25 
e) Less than four years. 0.00 
3. Government (or other fiscal branches representatives) participation at central bank meetings, 
where monetary decisions are taken. 
a) No government representation at central bank meetings. 1.00 
b) Government is represented at central bank meetings, but without right to vote.  0.50 
c) Government is represented at central bank meetings, with right to vote. 0.00 
Political Independence
4. Ultimate responsibility and authority on monetary policy decisions. 
a) Central bank has the ultimate (final) responsibility on monetary policy decisions.  1.00 
b) Central bank has not the ultimate responsibility on monetary policy decisions. 0.00 
5. Price stability 
a) It is the sole objective. 1.00 
b) It is one of two objectives, but it is given preference to price stability. 0.66 
c) It is one among various others objectives.  0.33 
d) Law does not establish anything about policy objectives. 0.00 
6. Banking supervision 
a) Not considered in the objectives or functions of the central bank. 1.00 
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Evaluation matrix of central bank independence and 
accountability 
c) It dominates other central bank functions or objectives. 0.00 
7. Monetary policy instruments 
a) Central bank enjoys autonomy is monetary policy instruments selection. 1.00 
b) Central bank is not autonomous in the selection of monetary policy instruments. 0.00 
Economic and Financial Independence
8. Government financing 
a) Central Bank cannot directly finance the government. 1.00 
b) Law allows that central bank provide credit facilities to government and other 
financing help.
0.00 
9. Ownership of the central bank’s (equity) capital 
a) Government does not own any central bank’s capital.  1.00 
b) Government owns less than half of the central banks capital. 0.66 
c) Government owns more than half of the central bank’s capital. 0.33 
d) Government owns all the central bank’s capital.  0.00 
Country
Independence Accountability
Personal Political Economic and 
Financial Total Ultimate 
objectives
Trans- 
parency
Final 
respon- 
sibility
Total
1 Argentina 1.25 1.83 1.00 4.08 1 1 2 4
2 Australia 0.50 2.16 0.00 2.66 1 1 5 7
3 Austria 1.66 2.16 1.00 4.82 2 2 1 5
4 Belgium 1.75 1.50 0.00 3.25 0 0 4 4
5 Canada 0.50 1.83 0.00 2.33 1 2 4 7
6 Chile 2.00 1.83 1.00 4.83 1 1 3 5
7
Czech 
republic 2.75 2.16 1.00 5.91 3 1 2 6
8 Denmark 2.16 1.83 0.00 3.99 1 1 2 4
9 EMU - ECB 2.50 2.66 1.00 6.16 3 1 1 5
10 England 1.00 2.66 0.00 3.66 4 3 4 11
11 Finland 2.50 2.66 1.00 6.16 2 1 2 5
12 France 1.50 2.16 1.00 4.66 3 1 2 6
13 Germany 1.25 1.83 1.00 4.08 2 0 1 3
14 Greece 1.58 2.16 1.00 4.74 2 1 2 5
15 Hungary 1.58 1.83 0.00 3.41 1 1 2 4
16 Iceland 1.75 2.33 0.00 4.08 1 1 4 6
17 Ireland 1.00 2.16 1.00 4.16 2 1 2 5
18 Italy 2.16 2.16 1.00 5.32 0 1 1 2
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Act or Statutes, according to the decomposition showed in the next page.  
Table 4 
Central Bank Legal Independence and Accountability 
evaluation (December 2000) 
Part 1 | Part 2 
Legal Independence 
19 Japan 1.00 1.83 0.00 2.83 1 2 3 6
20 Korea 0.75 2.16 0.00 2.91 3 2 4 9
21 Luxemburg 1.25 2.16 1.00 4.41 2 0 2 4
22 Mexico 1.83 1.33 0.00 3.16 1 1 2 4
23 Netherlands 1.75 2.16 0.00 3.91 2 1 2 5
24
New 
Zealand 1.83 2.16 1.00 4.99 4 2 4 10
25 Norway 1.58 1.83 0.00 3.41 1 1 5 7
26 Poland 1.25 2.16 0.00 3.41 2 3 3 8
27 Portugal 0.50 2.16 1.00 3.66 2 1 2 5
28 Spain 0.75 2.16 1.00 3.91 2 2 2 6
29 Sweden 2.75 2.16 1.00 5.91 2 1 1 4
30 Switzerland 2.08 2.33 1.00 5.41 1 1 2 4
31 Turkey 1.66 1.83 0.00 3.49 2 1 3 6
32 USA 2.00 1.83 0.00 3.83 1 3 2 6
Country 
Personal Political Economic and 
Financial Total
(1) (2) (3) Total (4) (5) (6) (7) Total (8) (9) Total
Argentina 0,00 0,75 0,50 1,25 1,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 1,00 nd 1,00 4,08
Australia 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,66
Austria 0,66 0,50 0,50 1,66 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 1,00 1,00 4,82
Belgium 0,00 0,75 1,00 1,75 0,00 0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50 0,00 0,33 0,00 3,25
Canada 0,00 0,00 0,50 0,50 0,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,33
Chile 1,00 1,00 0,00 2,00 0,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 1,00 nd 1,00 4,83
Czech 
Republic 1,00 0,75 1,00 2,75 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 nd 1,00 5,91
Denmark 0,66 1,00 0,50 2,16 1,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 0,00 nd 0,00 3,99
ECB 1,00 1,00 0,50 2,50 1,00 0,66 1,00 1,00 2,66 1,00 1,00 1,00 6,16
England 0,00 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,66 1,00 1,00 2,66 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,66
Finland 1,00 0,50 1,00 2,50 1,00 0,66 1,00 1,00 2,66 1,00 0,00 1,00 6,16
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Legal Accountability 
France 0,00 1,00 0,50 1,50 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 0,00 1,00 4,66
Germany 0,00 0,75 0,50 1,25 1,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 1,00 0,00 1,00 4,08
Greece 0,33 0,75 0,50 1,58 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 0,66 1,00 4,74
Hungary 0,33 0,75 0,50 1,58 1,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,41
Iceland 0,00 0,75 1,00 1,75 1,00 0,33 1,00 1,00 2,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,08
Ireland 0,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 0,33 1,00 4,16
Italy 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 1,00 1,00 5,32
Japan 0,00 0,50 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 0,00 0,33 0,00 2,83
Korea 0,00 0,25 0,50 0,75 0,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 0,00 nd 0,00 2,91
Luxemburg 0,00 0,75 0,50 1,25 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 0,00 1,00 4,41
Mexico 0,33 1,00 0,50 1,83 1,00 0,33 0,00 1,00 1,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,16
Netherlands 0,00 0,75 1,00 1,75 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 0,00 nd 0,00 3,91
New Zealand 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 0,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 nd 1,00 4,99
Norway 0,33 0,25 1,00 1,58 0,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,41
Poland 0,00 0,75 0,50 1,25 0,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 0,00 nd 0,00 3,41
Portugal 0,00 0,50 0,00 0,50 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 0,00 1,00 3,66
Spain 0,00 0,25 0,50 0,75 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 nd 1,00 3,91
Sweden 1,00 0,75 1,00 2,75 1,00 0,66 0,50 1,00 2,16 1,00 0,00 1,00 5,91
Switzerland 0,33 0,75 1,00 2,08 1,00 0,33 1,00 1,00 2,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 5,41
Turkey 0,66 0,50 0,50 1,66 1,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 0,00 0,66 0,00 3,49
USA 0,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 0,00 0,33 0,50 1,00 1,83 0,00 nd 0,00 3,83
maximum: 1 1 1 3 ---- 1 1 1 3 1 ---- 1 7,00
Country 
Ultimate Objectives Transparency Final Responsibility
Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total (5) (6) (7) Total (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) Total
Argentina 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 4
Australia  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 7
Austria  1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Belgium  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 4
Canada  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 7
Chile  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 5
Czech Republic 1 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 6
Denmark  1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 4
ECB  1 1 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
England  1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 11
Finland  1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 5
France  1 1 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 6
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Germany  1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3
Greece  1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 5
Hungary  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 4
Iceland  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 6
Ireland  1 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 5
Italy  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
Japan  1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 6
Korea  1 1 1 0 3 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 9
Luxemburg  1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 4
Mexico  1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 4
Netherlands  1 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 5
New Zealand  1 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 10
Norway  1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 7
Poland  1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 8
Portugal  1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 5
Spain  1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 6
Sweden  1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Switzerland  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4
Turkey  1 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 6
USA  1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 6
maximum:  1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 13
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